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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Thinking about the Unthinkable
Paul D. Taylor
Developments in South Asia during 1999 reminded the world that the nu-clear tests undertaken in 1998 by India and Pakistan had ominously in-
creased the danger of nuclear conflict. Pakistani occupation of territory in the
Kargil and Dras sectors on the Indian side of the Line of Control in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir precipitated the fourth sustained engagement between the
armed forces of India and Pakistan in the fifty years since independence and under-
scored the violent potential of incompatible claims inKashmir by the two countries.
The coupd’état in Pakistan inOctober 1999 raised questions about governance, sta-
bility, and democratic pluralism in a country that had spent about half of its politi-
cal life since independence under military rule. Late in the year, the hijacking of
Indian Airlines flight 814 by Pakistani militants introduced into the conflict the
specter of state-supported terrorism. Together these events created the climate for
the 28 percent increase in India’smilitary budget thatwas announced early in 2000.
SIMULATIONS OF THE UNTHINKABLE
Early in this chain of events, shortly after the nuclear tests in May 1998, the U.S.
NavalWar College, in Newport, Rhode Island, undertook a series of simulations
and “decision events” designed to examine the con-
sequences of these developments. The project
started from the premise that the tests had increased
the possibility of weaponization, deployment, and
use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In the tradi-
tion of games that the Navy had conducted in New-
port for more than a hundred years, the college’s
Decision Strategies Department organized a series
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of events that gathered experts from the U.S. government, academia, foreign
governments, business, private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations,
and military commands to react to a prepared scenario set in the year 2003.
Asking people from diverse backgrounds and organizations to interact with one
another as they grappled with the issues posed by a hypothetical scenario was in-
tended to produce insights that might have eluded an individual researcher or a
group working within a single discipline. In addition to playing roles in simula-
tions, participants were invited to develop their views in seminars employing a
combination of anonymous commentary (using a networked array of comput-
ers) and ordinary discussions. The scenario depicted conflict in South Asia esca-
lating from civic unrest and terrorism to an exchange of tactical nuclear
weapons; the events ranged in length from four hours to six working days.
MAJOR ISSUES
In the interest of learning how the players representing the U.S. government,
other governments, and other actors would respond to the hypothetical events,
researchers acting as game controllers presented, in various simulation settings,
successive segments of the event scenarios and then gave players free rein to react
as they believed their “character”would in a real situation. In seminars, the ques-
tions posed were deliberately broad and open-ended, such as, “How do you
think your organization or other organizations would respond to the events you
have just heard described?” In this manner, the organizers tried to avoid con-
straining responses, as well as to encourage maximum interactions among
participants.
In the exchanges that ensued, several questions emerged as salient in event af-
ter event.What could the United States or other actors in the international com-
munity do to discourage an escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan?
Could the United States or any other third country use military power to affect
the outcome of a conflict in South Asia? Inasmuch as India and Pakistan account
for only a minor share of international trade, would the impact on the world
economy of a nuclear war on the Asian subcontinent be modest? If the United
States and other countries wished to help ameliorate a disaster involving mil-
lions of casualties from a nuclear exchange, would they have the capacity to do
so? Recognizing that the human and economic costs of a nuclear war in South
Asia would likely be enormous, should the United States and other countries in-
vest resources and effort now to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan,
and also share with them the means of preventing an accidental disaster? Could
such things be done while maintaining the arms-length posture the United
States had assumed toward India and Pakistan in the name of nonproliferation?
Finally and fundamentally, is a future scenario in which violence between India
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and Pakistan that escalates to a substantial nuclear exchange plausible enough to
justify worrying about the other questions?
THE GAME SCENARIO
In the tradition of military gaming, a difficult scenario—the overall “scripted”
background and the situational framework within which role playing and dis-
cussion of important issues was to proceed during the successive events—was
elaborated. Developed in consultation with experts on South Asia from the U.S.
government and academia, the scenario was intended to stimulate planners to
address tough challenges. The designers stressed to participants in all the events
that the scenario was to be consid-
ered as only one possible future
and that it was not intended in
any sense as a prediction of the
most likely evolution of events.
The scenario was essentially the
same in each event, but it became more elaborate as the series evolved—espe-
cially after an event known as the International Game, when the actions of for-
eign players moved the narrative farther than had been envisioned.
The scenario events began with a crisis postulated in the year 2003:* The defeat
of a new resolution in the United Nations Security Council calling for international
involvement to resolve the status of Kashmir precipitated violent anti-Western and
anti-Hindu demonstrations in India and Pakistan. This civic unrest was accompa-
nied by a sharp increase in Islamic guerrilla activity in Kashmir. That activity cul-
minated in the downing, by a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, of an Indian
transport aircraft carrying the home minister, the minister of defense, and the army
chief of staff, who were en route to Srinagar for an inspection visit. “Informed re-
ports” implicated the government of Pakistan in the shoot-down. India responded
by launching Operation RESOLUTE SWORD, air and artillery attacks against targets
in Kashmir and northern Pakistan suspected of harboring and supporting perpe-
trators of violence in Kashmir and the rest of India. Simultaneously, the government
of India declared that its intentions were limited in both scope and objective. Fur-
ther, it issued an ultimatum demanding the immediate delivery of terrorist leaders
who were sheltered in Pakistan, the dismantling of known terrorist headquarters
and training facilities, and the removal of all Pakistani military forces from Kash-
mir. Initially, Pakistan offered little resistance to the Indian attacks, which inflicted
heavy damage to the infrastructure targets against which they were delivered.
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When Indian forces suspended their attack and began to celebrate the success of
RESOLUTE SWORD, the Pakistani high command seized the opportunity for a sur-
prise attack against Indian forces east and south of Lahore. During a two-day bat-
tle, Pakistani units managed to push about fifty kilometers into Indian territory,
inflicting heavy casualties on Indian civilians, before a counteroffensive repulsed
the Pakistani thrust. India matched its defeat of Pakistani troops in the Indian
Punjab with a rapid movement across the Thar Desert toward the Indus River.
Fearing that India was about to cut Pakistan in two, severing Islamabad’s economic
lifeline to the south, the Pakistani high command ordered a barrage of tactical mis-
sile strikes. Four of these missiles carried nuclear warheads: three twenty-kiloton
weapons were delivered against Indian forces to halt their advance toward the bor-
der, and the fourth was used against the supporting rail hub in Jodhpur. The strikes
stalled the Indian movement and destroyed the rail hub but also caused widespread
destruction among the civilian population of Jodhpur. Experts from the U.S. De-
fense Threat Reduction Agency estimated the number of dead and seriously injured
in the hundreds of thousands.
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
In January 1999, researchers organized a two-day international simulation to
gauge reactions to these hypothetical events and the capacity of the interna-
tional community to prevent, manage, and resolve such a conflict. The simula-
tion brought together a multinational cross section of diplomats, academics,
analysts, andmilitary personnel. The countries represented were Australia, Can-
ada, China, Finland, France, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,
Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Many of the diplomats present had reached the rank of ambassador in their
countries’ diplomatic services; one had served as foreign minister. In the game,
they were given roles as their countries’ principal representatives in the UN Se-
curity Council. In fact, they also had to replicate their governments’ entire decision-
making authorities, because they worked without the benefit of instructions
fromhome, and—with the exception of India and Pakistan—their actions in the
simulation were “free play,” based on their individual best judgment of what
their respective governments would do in response to the hypothetical situation
as it unfolded. The scenario prescribed most of the military actions of India and
Pakistan; however, even those nations’ representatives, who were experienced
diplomats and scholars, devised their own diplomatic activities.
The International Game was unusual in having countries represented by
their own nationals. This arrangement brought a greater degree of reality to the
responses of foreign countries than is usual in U.S. government–sponsored sim-
ulations, which are generally played exclusively by American experts.
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The participants were briefed on the scenario’s assumptions about the under-
lying situation for 2003. It assumed that unsatisfactory economic conditions had
fomented significant unrest in both countries, leading to a rise in nationalist fervor
and rhetoric. Both India and Pakistan had signed and ratified the Fissile Materials
Cutoff Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.* India’s real-world unilat-
eral policy of “no first use”of nuclear weapons was incorporated in the scenario;
Pakistan (reminiscent of the real-world posture of Nato during the Cold War)
had made no such commitment. Both India and Pakistan had nuclear warheads
that could be delivered by either aircraft or missile.
Move One of the simulation asked the players to react in the Security Council
to early events in the scenario, including the civic unrest and stepped-up guerrilla
activity, the shoot-down of the aircraft carrying Indian officials, and the beginning
of Operation RESOLUTE SWORD. The Security Council moved swiftly into action.
The Canadian delegate, in consul-
tation with the belligerents, pro-
posed a resolution calling upon
India and Pakistan to cease hostili-
ties and immediately disengage
their troops on both the Line of
Control and the international bor-
der. The resolution invited the UN
Secretary-General to strengthen the military observer group already in place and
deploy it on both sides of the border to witness the called-for disengagement. How-
ever, since the resolution would have committed troops without putting in place any
new confidence-building measures, several representatives of the Permanent Five
members** expressed reservations, and it was not adopted. Some of the delegates
suggested that the presence of nuclear weapons made a traditional peacekeeping op-
eration inappropriate.
At this point, the game-control cell advanced the players to Move Two, in
which the Pakistani authorities ordered a nuclear attack against Indian troops ad-
vancing toward the international border. The Pakistani delegate justified his coun-
try’s attack as purely defensive and stressed that it had been directed at strictly
military targets. The Indian delegation withdrew from the Security Council, de-
claring that the time for diplomacy had passed. The U.S. delegate and several others
condemned Pakistan for its use of nuclear weapons, while China insisted that the
international community bore a degree of responsibility for the Pakistani action, in
that it had neglected to ensure that a military balance existed in the region.
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The Permanent Five considered putting sanctions in place against Pakistan but
declined to intervene militarily to stop the crisis, fearing that such intervention
would only raise the stakes, perhaps even lead to World War III. The Pakistani rep-
resentative reacted to this decision with a mixture of disbelief and dismay, asserting
that this conflict was World War III.
While the Security Council cell debated, the Indian player let it be known that
his government had responded to the Pakistani strike by launching twelve nuclear
weapons of its own, in an attempt to destroy Pakistan’s entire nuclear research, pro-
duction, storage, and delivery capability.The game controllers assessed that it was
unclear whether this objective had been fully realized, but inasmuch as many of
Pakistan’s nuclear-related facilities postulated by the scenario were near popu-
lated areas, expert analysis by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency esti-
mated some fifteen million casualties from the attack, including one to two
million dead.
The Permanent Five, after separate consultations with India and Pakistan, now
developed a proposal for ending the crisis: immediate cessation of military activi-
ties, renunciation and elimination of nuclear activities by both countries, a return
to the status quo ante in Kashmir, and international security guarantees for both
India and Pakistan. Several delegates opined that the security guarantees would be
“difficult to sell” to their governments.
In a seminar discussion after the simulation, the senior Pakistani delegate ex-
plained that his government had been cognizant throughout the event of Paki-
stan’s unfavorable military balance with India. In an unscripted simulation, it
would have sued for a cease-fire during Move One. The Pakistani players had
been motivated in the game crisis, they explained, by eagerness to engage out-
side powers, especially China, Iran, and the United States, in forging a solution.
The Indian delegate argued that his government would have worked very hard to
reach a peaceful settlement but that once Pakistan fired nuclear weapons, only
one response would have been acceptable to India. The Russian player, a scholar
with strong ties to the Boris Yeltsin government (then still in power), explained
that his country might see a nuclear crisis in South Asia as an opportunity to ex-
pand the Russian role in a system in which Russia was frustrated by its lack of
clout. If breaking down the current nuclear proliferation regime could restore
Russia’s proper voice in the international system, he believed, a Russian govern-
ment might be willing for that purpose to renounce the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
In March 1999, a group of eighteen Americans—senior officials responsible for
U.S. economic policy, business executives, academics, and military
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officers—met for an evening and the following workday to examine the possible
economic and commercial consequences of a conflict in South Asia. The partici-
pants either occupied or had recently left offices ranking fromunder secretary to
deputy assistant secretary in the Departments of Commerce, State, and the
Treasury. They were not asked to play roles per se but to offer their considered
judgments about how the world would and should react to the events posed by
the scenario.
As the scenario was introduced, and even before the downing of the Indian
transport aircraft triggered a major escalation in the crisis, participants thought
that an increase in tensions between countries with nuclear arsenals would
cause investors and markets to
jump to worst-case conclusions
and precipitate an international
financial crisis. Firms with eco-
nomic interests in India and Paki-
stan would begin to hedge,
checking on the security of their
local employees and expatriates, evaluating financial exposure, and reviewing
policy options. (The “real world” was to produce something of a reality check
later, during the 1999 Kargil crisis, which would exhibit an eerie similarity to the
scenario up to this point.Markets were to seemmore relaxed in that actual event
than the discussants had been, however, suggesting that participants in simula-
tions may tend to anticipate escalation.)
When in the scenario military forces engaged in conventional exchanges, the
discussants judged that international markets were likely to go into a tailspin,
driving capital out of emerging markets to seek safe haven in the United States.
Leading governments and international financial institutions would be pressed
to resolve the resulting financial crisis. When the conflict widened, the partici-
pants judged, the humanitarian crisis within the subcontinent would increase
the pressure on foreign governments for action. Business representatives
strongly suggested that themost helpful way that governments could address the
economic and commercial crisis would be to use everymeans available to defuse
the underlying military and political crises before they deteriorated into a nu-
clear exchange.
When such an exchange occurred in the scenario, the participants concluded
that a nuclear exchange of the magnitude postulated would create a humanitar-
ian catastrophe. The situation would be hard for the government of the United
States and other major countries to ignore, even though some people might say
the governments of South Asia had caused the calamity and that it was up to
them to deal with the damage. Relief efforts would also be complicated by
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residual contamination and the possibility of further conflict. Other questions
would center on the capacity of the government of Pakistan to manage assis-
tance and the willingness of the government of India to accept it.
Depending on weather conditions, the discussants predicted, severe short-
ages of food and potable water could exceed the capacity of relief organizations
to respond and might even stress international markets. A conference of inter-
national donors would be required to mobilize the billions of dollars needed for
relief. The prices of certain commodities, especially foods, could skyrocket and
could trigger a global recession. Countless Indian and Pakistani citizens might
seek refuge abroad; large numbers of refugees could cause other countries to
create barriers to immigration. The most mobile people would carry away with
them skills needed at home; the flight of elites might be matched by decisions of
foreign investors in the region to take their chips off the table, resulting in pro-
found and lasting damage to the economies of India and Pakistan.
OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
More than fifty flag and field-grade Americanmilitary officers,middle-grade and
ambassadorial-level diplomats, civilian executives, and representatives of non-
governmental relief and developmental organizations participated in a six-day
simulation as part of Global 1999—the major annual simulation at the Naval
War College.Military officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom
joined them.Drawn from, inter alia, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Pacific
Command, the Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International
Development, and the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi, participants
reacted to the unfolding scenario in ways that they believed their organizations
would in a real crisis.
As the South Asian crisis began to develop in Global 1999, players pressed
diplomatic measures to keep it from escalating. At the same time, nations effected
voluntary withdrawals of their citizens from India and Pakistan. The eventual non-
combatant evacuation operation was complicated physically by the distance of
Islamabad and New Delhi from naval support ships at the outset, as well as by the
dangers to military units inserted to conduct the evacuation. There was also a sense
that the evacuation was sending a pessimistic signal as Washington was urging re-
straint on the local governments. The players did not anticipate that a nuclear ex-
change would occur as rapidly as the scenario dictated—only eight days after the
downing of the Indian transport—so the evacuation was not completed before
the nuclear strikes. Therefore, substantial numbers of Americans were presumed
among the casualties, including many U.S. citizens of Indian origin, particularly
those residing in the Punjab, from which they had been reluctant to depart.
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While participants did not perceive a direct intervention or deterrent role for
U.S. military forces in the crisis, they felt certain that in the aftermath of such a
nuclear exchange any U.S. administration would look to the U.S. military, with
its personnel, logistical, and technical resources, to carry heavy responsibilities
in conducting decontamination, disaster relief, and early reconstruction efforts.
Questions arose as to whether U.S. troops would be welcomed by the govern-
ments and the populations of the two countries, and whether the requirements
of short-term crisis management might conflict with the longer-term interests
of the United States in fostering constructive relations with both India and Paki-
stan. Military planners in the game sought to minimize the presence of U.S.
forces on the ground and to define in advance the exit strategies by which re-
sponsibility would pass to civilian and nongovernmental leadership.
In the Global 1999 simulation, the physical requirements of disaster relief
were found greatly to exceed current real-world preparations, which typically
envision disasters on the magnitude of the bombing of the World Trade Center
or the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. After the game, participants favored cre-
ation of a standing consequence-management force, an organization that could
be deployed to alleviate disasters anywhere in the world. This force would be a
ready and efficient alternative to current arrangements, under which regional
commanders in chief are responsible for planning and organizing efforts, the-
ater by theater. In its contingency planning, such a force would anticipate issues
of coordination with other countries and determine how its activities would be
directed on the ground.
Global 1999 players also concluded that although nongovernmental orga-
nizations were well equipped to assess local needs and deliver relief, they typi-
cally did not plan for major emergencies and certainly would not have the
resources in personnel or materiel to contribute meaningfully in the aftermath
of a nuclear exchange without enormous transfers from governments.
Nongovernmental organizations wouldmost likely have to perform “triage”—that
is, explicitly identify the relatively small portion of victims they would be able to
help, deliberately but unavoidably leaving many hundreds of thousands, per-
haps even millions, without aid. Participants recommended more aggressive
contingency planning and early integration of nongovernmental organizations
into planning.
IMPORTANT INSIGHTS
This overall project examined a hypothetical problem from the perspectives of
fifteen countries and specialties ranging from warrior to diplomat, missionary,
and investor. Its most compelling result was that while participants differed on
the details of their assessments and their remedies, and while some participants
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in each event commented that the scenario pushed events more relentlessly to-
ward nuclear war than they would expect in a real situation, no one argued that
the scenario could not happen. In fact, they frequently expressed fears that it was
a worrisome and consequential possibility.
The players in the simulations and seminars identified no significant military
role for the United States or its allies in a military crisis between India and Paki-
stan. They asserted that though the United States and others might wish to help
ameliorate a disaster involving millions of casualties from a nuclear exchange,
the magnitude of resources and efforts required would be well beyond those en-
visioned in current contingency planning. The U.S. government, they suggested,
should start now to create a standing, deployable “consequence management”
force that could provide skills andmaterial aid to help relieve the effects of major
catastrophes anywhere in the world.
Participants argued that in economic terms alone, the costs to the world of
dealing with the consequences of a nuclear exchange between India and Paki-
stan would far exceed the cost of trying to prevent one. On the other hand, they
noted that the influence of the
United States was limited and, in
the simulations, only became
more so as the crisis escalated.
Still, time after time participants
asked whether the international
community was doing all it could to prevent terrorism over Kashmir and, in-
deed, whether more could be done to encourage India and Pakistan to reach a
settlement in the Kashmir dispute itself.
An understanding of the problem needs to take account of the fact that India
and Pakistan see different threats emanating from each other. Simply put, Paki-
stanis stress the injustice of India’s occupation of a large portion of a state in
which Moslems are a majority, while fearing India’s stronger conventional
forces; they accordingly seek international help to redress a wrong. Indians recall
the accession of Kashmir by the governing maharaja at the time of partition—a
legitimate procedure under international law, in their view—and reject any out-
side interference that could upset the status quo. Their main fear with respect to
Pakistan is that its successful support of Kashmiri secession could cause groups
elsewhere in India to seek new status for themselves—a prospect made worse by
the specter of a fundamentalist Islamic government coming to power in
Islamabad and mounting a jihad to free Kashmir. Any long-term solution will
somehow have to give to Pakistanis a greater sense of security vis-à-vis their
more powerful neighbor, and to Indians confidence that their pluralistic society
can be protected against exploitation by outside agitators. The disagreement
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over Kashmir, which has provided the flash point for the series of conflicts since
independence, might best be resolved as a secondary problem addressed in a
context of broader concerns. That approach might also offer a way around the
inherent conflict between attempting to apply outside pressure for resolution
and simultaneously arguing that a solution has to be forged between the Indians
and Pakistanis themselves.
Participants in the project’s simulations wondered if the United States and others
could facilitate a solution in the same way U.S. diplomacy has contributed on
several occasions to ameliorating conflicts in theMiddle East andNorthern Ireland,
where conflicting claims have often appeared at least as intractable as those in
South Asia. Some results had been achieved in those cases even though the gov-
ernments of two close allies of the United States—Israel and the United King-
dom—had argued for years that for the United States even to talk to the groups
that had terrorized their countries would be wrong and counterproductive.
Finally, many players throughout the simulation underscored the need to re-
examine policies that weaken U.S. leverage in defusing potential crises. At pres-
ent, as punishment for their proliferation, American policy denies military sales
to India and Pakistan and the use of International Military Education and
Training funds for attendance by their personnel in U.S. military schools and
training courses. Additionally, military-to-military contacts with Pakistan are
proscribed as a consequence of the coup d’état. American unhappiness with the
nuclear tests and the coup needed to be expressed, but avoiding interactions
with Indians and Pakistanis even on nonsensitive subjects has the effect of mini-
mizing American influence on the very people whomight push their countries into
amilitary escalation, and it prevents theUnited States fromgetting to know the next
generation of military leaders. In addition, current policy prevents theUnited States
from engaging with the two governments on just the kind of confidence-building
measures needed now on both sides to decrease the chance of a nuclear ex-
change: reliable nuclear command and control systems, for example, and nu-
clear threat reduction centers of the type the United States and the Soviet Union
established, as well as cooperative threat reduction measures to reduce tensions
between conventional forces along the border.
American policy, these simulations suggest, has stressed the laudable objec-
tive of discouraging nuclear proliferation to the point of dangerously reducing
its own ability to discourage the use of the nuclear technology that India and Pa-
kistan now possess. The United States would wield more influence over India
and Pakistan if it accepted the fact of their nuclear status and attempted to estab-
lish safeguards and counter-use regimes, even while working to dissuade other
countries from gaining a nuclear capability. In the last analysis, the Newport
games warn, a policy based on the hope that either India or Pakistan is going to
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abandon its nuclear arsenal is almost certainly wishful thinking and provides no
basis for exerting U.S. influence in the urgent and difficult work of keeping those
weapons from being employed.
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